Karlsruher Institut für Technologie

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Bachelor Thesis in Macroeconomics

# U.S. Commercial Banks: Trends and Cycles

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# Contents

# 1 Introduction

This thesis is an explorative investigation through the historical balance sheet filings of U.S. commercial banks. Its objective is to shed light on the financial development of arguably the most important backbone of the U.S. economy: commercial banking. Not least, the severe financial crisis in 2008, which originated from the banking industry, proves the importance of regulating commercial banking (Østrup et al. (2009)). However, only with a deep empirical understanding of the behaviour of commercial banks, one can design regulations that are ultimately effective. Using a dataset of balance sheets originally provided as call reports by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), we analyse the cross-section over time to unveil interesting stylized facts about financial trends (long-term) and cycles (short-term) among commercial banks. The data gives us the unique possibility to get a detailed view into every balance sheet account of both assets and liabilities. We study the dynamics of each account on an aggregated level (all commercial banks) and by different bank sizes. With careful consideration of contextual information such as crisis and regulatory efforts in the considered time frame, spanning the years between 1976-2013, we are able to gather time-sensitive analytics.
Overall, the two banking crises around 1990 and 2007-08 impacted the stability of commercial banking the most. In the 2007-08 crisis, commercial banks balance sheets expand from 2007 to the first half of 2008 and only begin to contract in the second half of 2008. This behaviour was related to a variety of factors such as: Investment banks bore the first impacts of the crisis, loans prepared for syndication needed to stay on commercial banks balance sheet as demand stalled, monetary interventions by the FED and more. The period around 1990 was also marked by more than one primary factor that caused the market disruption.
In general, our findings indicate that larger commercial banks tend to suffer more in crisis. Part of the thesis focuses on the problematic commonly referred to as *"Too Big to Fail"*, where we show the rising unequal distribution of assets among commercial banks and find that economic downturns act as a way of redistributing assets among banks.
The differences between large and small banks is not limited to periods in crisis. Balance sheets vary significantly between banks of different sizes. Large and small banks differ in their balance sheet composition and risk appetite. For instance, the larger the bank, the more alternative ways of financing are utilized.
Finally, we take a look at leverage - a concept of great importance in economics.Geanakoplos (2010) emphasizes its importance in times of crisis, by showing that leverage has a large impact on asset prices, contributing to booms and busts. We analyse leverage among commercial banks over-time and discover that in the 2007-08 crisis there was a spill-over effect, with large banks falling into distress first and smaller banks following with a lag. Furthermore, a common area of interest regarding leverage is its pro-cyclicality with as-

sets. Adrian and Shin (2011) found pro-cyclical leverage for all commercial banks.[1] To confirm that their findings are robust, we varied a number of factors in our computations such the use of a longer time frame of the underlying data and the use of average measures. We also distinguish between banks of different sizes. This gave use the ability to expand on the phenomenon of pro-cyclicality among commercial banks. We discover that while large commercial banks do show pro-cyclical leverage, small banks actually show no clear cyclical leverage pattern in regards to changes in cyclical assets over the time frame from $1976 - 2013$. While the leverage of the small bank sector as a whole is pro-cyclical, the average small bank does not feature pro-cyclical leverage. These differing results suggest strong heterogeneity within the small banks. They would need to be split in further categories to draw more conclusions.

In addition, we find that pro-cyclicality is not consistent over the time frame from $1980 - 2010$. Although the industry leverage does seem to be pro-cyclical most of the time, the average commercial bank does have pro-cyclical leverage from $1980 - 1990$, but counter-cyclical leverage from $2000 - 2010$. Thus, although we can not observe consistent pro-cyclical leverage among all commercial banks, our results align with Adrian and Shin (2011) notion that commercial banks tend to actively manage leverage in regards to cyclical asset variations.

The thesis is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the data used. Then, we give a general overview of commercial banks and elaborate on each balance sheet position. A section looking at the distribution of assets among banks follows. We then continue by analysing banks of different sizes. Lastly, we examine commercial banks' leverage.

# 2 Data

The analysis in this thesis is build upon a dataset of balance sheets originally provided by the FFIEC. Also named call reports, the FFIEC collects balance sheet information quarterly from every FDIC insured institution. Drechsler et al. (2017) used these reports and formed a consistent time-series from year 1976 to 2013, accounting for variable and other changes over the years. They only included commercial banks - banks with charter type 200. Bank filings with negative equity are removed from the dataset, since they indicate a bankrupt bank. To prevent skewing the data, the two big investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, becoming commercial banks in the proceedings of the financial crisis 2008, are removed. When looking at leverage, we aggregate all commercial banks to their belonging bank holding companies. Furthermore, in the analysis it was often a few key players that drive the measurements. This aligns with the interdependent bank system of today, where just one "too big" bank going bankrupt can lead to significant spillover effects. Hence, we took those key players into careful consideration and did

[1] Adrian and Shin (2011) study the industry leverage by aggregating assets and equity.

not filter them out as outliers. In the proceedings of the analysis, we took recession definitions provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research into account. They define a recession not in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP, but a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production and wholesale-retail sales (NBER (2010)). In addition, we differentiate between so called "banking" (originated in the banking sector) versus "market" (originated from outside banking sector) crisis as in Berger and Bouwman (2012). The assumption is that banking crisis are more strongly reflected in bank data. The banking crisis are the credit crunch of the early 1990s (1990:Q3-1991:Q2) and the 2007-08 financial crisis (2007:Q4-2009:Q3). The market crisis are the two 1980s recessions (1980:Q1-1980:Q3 and 1981:Q3-1982:Q4) and the dotcom bubble (2001:Q2-2001:Q4). Additional events that could be considered as crisis, but are not mentioned by the NBER, are the 1987 stock market crash (1987:Q4), the Russian debt crisis and the Long-Term Capital Management (LCTM) bailout of 1998 (1998:Q3–1998:Q4) and the terrorist attacks in early 2000s. Berger and Bouwman (2012), for example, also included these events in their analysis. Apart from those crisis, it is important to consider other structural events that affected the U.S. commercial banks landscape considerably. We describe the most important ones here. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 repealed part of the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933, removing barriers that prevented banks from offering traditional commercial banking services and investment banking services or insurance company services at the same time. The Reigle-Neil law in 1994 removed several obstacles to banks opening branches in other states and provided a uniform set of rules regarding banking in each state. The FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA), passed in 1991, gave the FIDC the responsibility to rescue banks with the least-costly method. Aimed to relativize the evolving moral hazard. To improve banking sectors' stability, regulators started to implement capital and liquidity regulations with the Basel 1 framework in 1988. They released further improvements of this framework with Basel 2 in 2004 and Basel 3 in 2010. Lastly, during the considered time frame the banking sector experienced a wide-spread adoption of financial innovations, the main ones being interest rate derivatives, asset securitization and adjustable rate mortgages.

# 3 U.S. commercial banks

This section provides an overview about the distribution of financial components held by the U.S. commercial banking sector as a whole. We will see what types and amounts of financial instruments banks hold and how these positions have evolved over time.

## 3.1 Stylized balance sheet

Table 1 shows the balance sheet of a typical U.S. commercial bank.

| **Assets** | **Liabilities** |
|---|---|
| Cash | Equity |
| Fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (fedfundsrepoassets) | Fed funds bought and securities sold under agreements to repurchase |
| Securities:<br>- Treasury<br>- Mortgage-backed Security (MBS)<br>- Other | Deposits:<br>- short<br>- other |
| Loans net | Other borrowed money |
| Trading assets: | Trading liabilities: |
| - net interest rate derivatives<br>- net other fixed income<br>- net other trading | |
| Other assets | Other liabilities |

**Figure 1:** Stylized balance sheet of U.S. commercial bank.

We simplify the balance sheet of a typical U.S. commercial bank as in Begenau et al. (2015). It is important to note that every position besides the trading assets are not held for trading purposes. For example, the securities position and the loans position are not held for trading. Cash consists of noninterest-bearing balances, with currency and coin included, and of interest-bearing balances. Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell are both ways of lending excess cash to fellow commercial banks in return for interest. Fed funds bought and securities sold under agreements to repurchase in turn are ways of borrowing cash in the short-term. Securities can be divided into held-to-maturity and available-for-sale. These categories then include a large amount of different types of securities, with Treasury and MBS being the largest. Loans are netted by unearned income and allowance for loan and lease losses to gather their existent value. Trading assets are securities held with the intention to sell them with profit. They are intended to be held only for short-term. Trading asset can be in any type of form such as a derivative, Mortage-backed Security (MBS) or a loan. Trading liabilities tend to be in the form of short positions or derivatives. Deposits can be divided into transaction and non-transaction deposits. Time and savings deposits make up non-transaction deposits, while the major part of transaction deposits are demand deposits. Other assets are composed of derivatives "not for trading" and other items that have a small share and do not fit into the named categories.

## 3.2 Overview

This section aims to give an overview of the development of the commercial banking sector in the U.S. over the time frame from 1976 to 2013. Figure 2 shows how the aggregated total assets held by all commercial banks have evolved over time. Every tick represents one financial quarter for the commercial banks.[2]




**Figure 2:** Assets.

In particular, the first panel in Figure 2 shows how the aggregate total assets split into its accounts evolved over time. The value of assets rose from below 2 trillion to above 13 trillion dollars. In comparison, the GDP of U.S. rose from 1.9 trillion in 1976 to 16.78 trillion in 2013. The second panel shows the growth rate of assets per year. The two graphs already give a first insight into which periods of time had a particular impact on commercial banks assets. There are two periods with low growth - the credit crunch in 1990$s$ and the $2007-08$ financial crisis. The period around 1990 is marked by a period of consistent low growth over several years, while the financial crisis in $2007-08$ causes a short but significant year of negative growth in 2009. We will dive into more detailed analysis of these periods when looking into the banks' business cycles.

[2]This time series axis format is used consistently across all graphs in this thesis.

## 3.3 Banks' balance sheet: Cycles

To analyse commercial banks business cycles, we filter the time series for aggregate assets to extract the cyclical component shown in Figure 3.[3]




**Figure 3:** Cyclical Assets.

Additionally, we plotted the cyclical component of each balance sheet account in Figure 4. In Figure 4, the left column represents the asset side and the right column the liabilities side of a balance sheet. The cyclical movements in all figures can be interpreted as percentage changes and the gray areas indicate crises, as defined in section 2. Note that the aggregate balance sheet accounts mainly represent the large banks, because of their large market share. We address this point in section 4 and cover banks of different sizes in section 5.

In the following paragraphs, we focus the analysis on the most significant crisis periods. For this case we consider the definitions of crisis by NBER. Nevertheless, we are almost certain that the NBER crisis periods do not always align with the balance sheets of commercial banks. After all, the NBER does consider more factors than the business cycles of commercial banks. However, commercial banks' lending and transaction practises do play a key role in the overall economic welfare of a country. As a result we would expect that their business cycles match an economies boom and bust cycles to some extent.

[3]In the thesis, we always first log all data and then compute the cyclical component with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter using the recommended parameter 1600 for quartely time-series.




**Figure 4:** Cyclical asset accounts(left column) and cyclical liability accounts(right column). Trading assets and liabilities have missing data in the beginning of the time period.

**2007-08 Financial crisis** The 2007-08 financial crisis is reflected in the asset cycle of commercial banks with a lag. The assets experience a significant boom leading up the crisis, and only after 2008 Quarter 3 we see a rapid decrease in value. To explain this observation, several factors need to be accounted for. First, especially in the beginning of the crisis the major and more direct effects were born by the investment banks. In Antoniades (2019) it is argued that the crisis itself was marked by sudden aggregate funding pressures. These funding pressures had a much stronger impact on investment banks than on commercial banks. Hence, the assets of investment banks might have decreased immediately with the beginning of the $2007-08$ crisis, but not those of commercial banks. They provided a key source of liquidity at the beginning of the crisis for investment banks as financial markets liquidity dried up. Commercial banks were later affected by the general deterioration of assets in the real estate sector, which was a longer process beginning in 2006 and lasting until 2013 according to Antoniades (2019). Second, the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) used a series of regulatory efforts to ease the impacts of the crisis.[4] These had an effect on the valuation of commercial banks' assets and might be the reason why the maximum cyclical deviation of over 6% was substantially larger than the negative one that followed with just over $-2\%$. Next to other smaller interventions, a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was passed by congress to reduce the negative impact of the substantial amount of illiquid structured securities and mortgages still held by banks. Last, as outlined in Bech and Rice (2009), major restructuring events occur over the crisis period, with acquisitions and mergers boosting aggregate assets by more than 580 Billion dollar. Removing the most relevant restructuring event in 2008, that is the acquisition of Washington Mutual Bank's by JPMorgan Chase, we can see a reduced second spike in Figure 5 in the crisis period. Table 1 also shows that in third quarter of 2008 (2008-09-30) the adjusted cycle is 1.3% lower.




**Figure 5:** Cyclical Assets adjusted to 2008 merger activities.

[4]See the Monetary Policy Report to Congress mentioned in the bibliography - (Reserve, 2009)

| date | assets | adjusted assets |
|---|---|---|
| 2006-12-31 | 0.824750 | 1.470871 |
| 2007-03-31 | -0.684682 | 0.089768 |
| 2007-06-30 | 0.134683 | 1.048002 |
| 2007-09-30 | 1.798102 | 2.859592 |
| 2007-12-31 | 3.591668 | 4.072812 |
| 2008-03-31 | 4.890253 | 5.553139 |
| 2008-06-30 | 2.760897 | 3.582187 |
| 2008-09-30 | 6.747049 | 5.433013 |
| 2008-12-31 | 6.466594 | 5.341310 |
| 2009-03-31 | 2.430431 | 1.368396 |
| 2009-06-30 | 0.578924 | -0.365331 |
| 2009-09-30 | -0.100060 | -0.903298 |
| 2009-12-31 | -1.062005 | -1.747212 |

**Table 1:** Comparison of asset cycles in 2007-08 crisis. The adjusted asset cycle has 2008 merger activities removed. The cycles are in percentage.

We are also interested in the main balance sheet accounts that drove the cyclical behaviour in 2008. In general, loans and securities have the largest share in regards to total assets and were likely the driver of aggregate assets. All other accounts have a share below 10% during the crisis.[5] In Figure 4 we see that securities have its lowest point at the beginning and then rise over the period of the crisis. Hence, securities might only have contributed for the second spike in mid-2008. Loans, however, match the behaviour of aggregate assets and could be the main contributor to cyclical aggregate asset movements in $2007-08$. Bassett and King (2008) mention that the reason for the strong loan growth in 2007, results from loans that banks planned to move off the balance sheet by selling them to investors. However, investors suddenly lost interest in these loans towards the end of 2007, because of concerns about their quality. This forced the banks to keep the loans on their balance sheet. In the second half of 2008 loans then fell. This might have been partly caused by an increase in loan loss provision, the loans are netted with. Figure 6 shows us the loan loss provision account cycle to underline this thought. An increase of more than 50% in the 2007-08 crisis can be observed.

[5]Figure 8 shows the share of balance sheet accounts. We will address this figure in detail in section 3.4.




**Figure 6:** Cyclical Loan Loss Provision.

Other balance sheet accounts also behave differently than normal in the crisis, as seen in Figure 4. Cash, for instance, rose over 25% in the crisis, outshining every cyclical movement of cash in other time periods. With the background of the crisis it seems reasonable that banks liquidated assets in 2008 to be prepared for potential liquidity pressures. Other borrowed money and foreign deposits show significant growth in the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008. Similar to loans, this was followed by an immediate drop in the second half of 2008. Here, part of the loan growth observed leading up to crisis, as mentioned by Bassett and King (2008), was financed by other borrowed money and foreign deposits.[6] A positive correlation of both accounts with loans supports this thought.[7] Lastly, the trading assets cycle falls over the period of the crisis from +25% to just below 0%.

**Other crisis** The early 1980*s* recession does not have a stronger impact on the cyclical movements than periods without crisis. But the 1990*s* credit crunch and 2001 dotcom bubble triggered downward movements of the commercial bank asset cycles below the trend. These two crises lead the asset cycles to reach their lowest points - in 1993 around $-4\%$ and 2002 around $-4.2\%$ . The two minimum points occur after the crises, indicating a lag between the crises and its effect on the balance sheet size of commercial banks.

**Other anomalies** Equity has its lowest downward variation in 2003. We will see more of equities behaviour in the leverage section, when we analyse it in relation to total assets. Another interesting observation is that some positions show larger fluctuations in more recent times. The volatility of federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (fedfundsrepoasset) increased from 1996 onwards and of foreign deposits from 1992 onwards as seen in Figure 4.

[6]Section 3.4 deals with other borrowed money in more depth.

[7]Other borrowed money has a correlation of 0.45 and foreign deposits a correlation of 0.59 with loans (see Table 4). Note, correlations are computed over the whole time period $1976 - 2013$. We will address correlations in a following paragraph.

**Relationships between balance sheet accounts** We now take a look at possible relationships between commercial bank balance sheet accounts. Table 2, 3 and 4 show the correlations between each of the balance sheet accounts.[8] All correlations are computed using the linear Pearsons' correlation coefficient and assessed by their significance using a 2-tailed p-value. The significance is determined according to standard levels.[9] We find a strong inverse relationship of -0.73 between loans and securities as reported in Table 2. When securities fall, loans rise and vice versa. The scatter plot in Figure 7 illustrates this negative relationship. This does not come as a surprise, as in the process of securitization usually part of the loans are packaged into securities, such as, mortgage backed securities and others.

Furthermore, there is a small positive relationship between fedfundsrepoassets and trading assets. This could indicate that banks lending out excess federal funds (fed funds) or purchasing repurchase agreements (repos) are in such a healthy position to enable them to increase trading assets as well. The scatterplot of this relationship in Figure 7 confirms a possible positive linear correlation. A similar positive relationship can be seen between fedfundsrepoassets and loans. However, the scatterplot in Figure 7 does not support a clear relationship.

Domestic deposits are also negative correlated with foreign deposits (-0.34) and other borrowed money (-0.23). Bassett and King (2008) mention that in the financial 2007-08 crisis, commercial banks turn to foreign deposits and other borrowed money for financing as domestic deposits fall. This behaviour could explain the inverse relationship in general. Foreign deposits and borrowed money can be seen as alternative ways of financing to compensate for fluctuations in deposits. In addition, there is a positive correlation of 0.37 between equity and trading assets, indicating that increases in equity lead to increases in trading.

| | cash | fedfundsrepoasset | securities | loansnet | tradingassets | otherassets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cash | 1.0*** | -0.07 | 0.06 | -0.01 | -0.08 | 0.1 |
| fedfundsrepoasset | -0.07 | 1.0*** | -0.34*** | 0.23*** | 0.34*** | 0.15* |
| securities | 0.06 | -0.34*** | 1.0*** | -0.73*** | -0.12 | -0.01 |
| loansnet | -0.01 | 0.23*** | -0.73*** | 1.0*** | 0.11 | -0.06 |
| tradingassets | -0.08 | 0.34*** | -0.12 | 0.11 | 1.0*** | -0.12 |
| otherassets | 0.1 | 0.15* | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.12 | 1.0*** |

**Table 2:** Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Assets.

[8]Note, the mere assumption of a correlation between the two sides of a balance sheet contradicts the Modigliani-Miller-Theorem. The Theorem states the independence of assets by the financing capital structure. In addition, a key part of asset liability management for banks is maturity transformation. For correlation analysis, we should have differed between the different maturities of assets and liabilities. Correlations between positions of different maturity would have a more causal relationship. Furthermore, canonical correlation analysis could have been used to consider that balance sheet positions are jointly determined by the other positions.

[9]Significance levels are: $***: p < 0.01$, $**: p < 0.05$, $*: p < 0.1$

| | eq | fed | dep | fdep | otborr | trliab | subord | otliab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| eq | 1.0*** | 0.21*** | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.06 | 0.12 | 0.27*** | 0.08 |
| fed | 0.21*** | 1.0*** | 0.04 | 0.32*** | 0.23*** | 0.28*** | 0.25*** | 0.07 |
| dep | -0.02 | 0.04 | 1.0*** | -0.34*** | -0.23*** | 0.04 | 0.11 | -0.11 |
| fdep | 0.04 | 0.32*** | -0.34*** | 1.0*** | 0.59*** | 0.16** | 0.13 | 0.06 |
| otborr | -0.06 | 0.23*** | -0.23*** | 0.59*** | 1.0*** | 0.08 | 0.15* | 0.01 |
| trliab | 0.12 | 0.28*** | 0.04 | 0.16** | 0.08 | 1.0*** | 0.18** | 0.15* |
| subord | 0.27*** | 0.25*** | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.15* | 0.18** | 1.0*** | 0.04 |
| otliab | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.11 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.15* | 0.04 | 1.0*** |

**Table 3:** Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Liabilities. Legend: (eq = equity, fed = fedfundsrepoliab, dep = deposits, fdep = foreigndep, otborr = otherborrowedmoney, trliab = tradingliabilities, subord = subordinateddebt, otliab = otherliab).

| | eq | fed | dep | fdep | otborr | trliab | subord | otliab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cash | -0.25*** | 0.06 | 0.38*** | 0.04 | 0.28*** | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.14* |
| fedfundsrepoasset | 0.21*** | 0.57*** | 0.32*** | 0.03 | -0.12 | 0.48*** | 0.3*** | 0.14* |
| securities | -0.06 | -0.23*** | 0.08 | -0.38*** | -0.33*** | -0.16** | -0.18** | -0.18** |
| loansnet | 0.06 | 0.41*** | 0.17** | 0.59*** | 0.54*** | 0.15* | 0.21** | 0.14* |
| tradingassets | 0.37*** | 0.36*** | -0.09 | 0.23*** | 0.14* | 0.49*** | 0.35*** | 0.01 |
| otherassets | 0.02 | 0.1 | -0.01 | 0.12 | -0.07 | 0.04 | -0.18** | 0.35*** |

**Table 4:** Pearson Correlation Coefficient between Assets and Liabilities. Legend: (eq = equity, fed = fedfundsrepoliab, dep = deposits, fdep = foreigndep, otborr = otherborrowedmoney, trliab = tradingliabilities, subord = subordinateddebt, otliab = otherliab).




**Figure 7:** Scatterplot for selected positions and linear regression based on the detrended data used in Figure 4. Shaded area indicates a confidence interval.

## 3.4 Banks' balance sheet composition: Trends

This section identifies long-term trends by analysing the shares of different balance sheet accounts over time. Figure 8 shows the share of each account over time.




**Figure 8:** Share of balance sheet positions. The first two graphs show assets, where the second is a focus of the first. The third and fourth panel show liabilities, where the fourth is a focus of the third.

We can see that loans are the main target of investment for commercial banks. Throughout the 37-year time frame the share of loans stays between 50% and 60%. Banks start with a share at 55% until it rises to just above 60% from 1985 onwards. The credit crunch crisis in 1991 causes a fall of the share back to 55%. This fall continued until 1995. From then on, the share of loans rise back to 60% until 2008, where it starts to fall again. It falls to an all-time low in 2013 with a share of just above 50%. This came along with a rise in securities, confirming the observed negative relationship between securities and loans in the section before. The development of the cash share is also interesting.

Cash continuously falls from a share of just below 20% to a share of below 5%. Here, the 2007-08 crisis also marks a turning point with the cash share rising to above 10%. On the liability side, deposits are the dominating source of funding for commercial banks. The share starts in 1976 with 70% and falls until 2008 to an all-time low of just above 50%. From there it goes back to roughly 65%. This decrease in deposits, especially until 2008, must obviously come along with the increases of other types of finance. In particular, other borrowed and foreign deposits rise with the decrease of domestic deposits. This again confirms the thought raised in the sections before. Both are seen as an alternative source of financing when domestic deposits decrease. Other borrowed money has a peak in 2008. Other borrowed money consists of Federal Home Loan Bank advances (FHLB) and other borrowings not clearly defined. After the crisis in 2008 there is a rapid decrease in other borrowings. FHLB advances are mainly used in funding mortgages for low income households, which explains the alignment with the housing crisis in 2008.[10] Lastly, Figure 8 shows a general increase in the share of equity commercial banks hold from just above 5% to above 10%.

## 3.5 Defaults

Bank failures are another way of examining the stability of the commercial banking sector over time. In Figure 9 we show the banks default rate per year. For instance, in 1989 there were around 0.6% defaults. It is based on the negative equity recorded by banks. Hence, it is not exact and some banks might continue to exist in case of mergers or bailouts. Also, sometimes banks are counted several times if despite negative equity, they continue to publish their reports more than one last time.




**Figure 9:** Bank Failures.

[10] See the Affordable Mortgage Lending Guide by the FDIC mentioned in the bibliography FDIC (n.d.)

Bank failures align with the asset growth graph shown in Figure 2. In periods with a lot of defaults, there is a low asset growth rate. Periods that mark high default rates are from 1983-1992 and 2009-2013. These periods are arguably strongly interconnected with the two banking crisis - the credit crunch in 1990 and the financial crisis in 2007-08. The first high default period has much higher default rates and lasts much longer than the second. The significance difference in numbers comes from the fact that in the 1980s it was mostly small banks that defaulted, whereas in 2009 onwards there were more defaults among banks with a larger asset size. To confirm, in the 1980s, 74% of the defaults were small banks, while in 2010 the share of small banks defaults was only at 35%. We elaborate on the change in banking landscape in section 4. The reason why the first period lasts much longer cannot be easily explained. According to FDIC (1997) there were various forces working together to produce this long period of defaults. Hence, the 1990 credit crunch might be related to the defaults, but is not seen as the major cause. Another point regarding the 2007-08 crisis is the timing of the defaults - almost two years after the beginning of the crisis. This again, might be related to the argument Antoniades (2019) makes about the funding pressures being a main characteristic of the 2007-08 crisis. Funding pressures caused investment banks to default in the 2007-08 crisis, but not commercial banks. These went bankrupt later by the deterioration of assets in the real estate sector.

# 4 Too Big to Fail: Distribution of assets among banks

This section empirically illustrates a problem commonly referred to as *"Too Big to Fail"*. Banks are considered as "*too big to fail*", when their size and interconnections with other banks are so high that its individual risk impacts the systemic risk of a whole economy. Regulators tend to be reluctant to close those banks when they default, allowing a moral hazard to emerge. The term first came into play with the failure and bailout of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in 1984 (Nurisso and Prescott (2017)). From that point onwards, it developed into a world-wide phenomenon with its severe consequences unveiled in the financial crisis of 2008.

Indeed, over the last few centuries the number of banks on the U.S. landscape has fallen significantly from 14419 banks in 1976 to 6035 banks in 2013. While the mere reduction would not impose such a problem, the distribution of total assets developed more and more unequal. In 1976 the top 0.1%, a total of 14 banks, held 32.4% of all assets. In comparison, in 2013 the top 0.1%, a total of 6 banks, held 50% of all assets. Table 5 and Figure 10 report these numbers by looking at the assets distribution by banks percentiles.

| | Top 0.1% | Top 1% | Top 10% | Top 50% | Total all banks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1976 | 0.324922 | 0.558099 | 0.780650 | 0.946214 | 14419 |
| 1980 | 0.340622 | 0.581818 | 0.793497 | 0.948957 | 14417 |
| 1984 | 0.288709 | 0.556493 | 0.790446 | 0.948429 | 14389 |
| 1988 | 0.240856 | 0.546860 | 0.811423 | 0.954550 | 12982 |
| 1992 | 0.228150 | 0.539679 | 0.811301 | 0.954310 | 11363 |
| 1996 | 0.273671 | 0.609738 | 0.850118 | 0.964386 | 9464 |
| 2000 | 0.348473 | 0.701729 | 0.881838 | 0.972520 | 8252 |
| 2004 | 0.452258 | 0.741929 | 0.891446 | 0.975372 | 7567 |
| 2008 | 0.510510 | 0.794367 | 0.910356 | 0.980069 | 7022 |
| 2012 | 0.506170 | 0.801828 | 0.916754 | 0.980764 | 6035 |

**Table 5:** Count of banks by percentiles.




**Figure 10:** Aggregate assets by percentiles.

The degree of inequality among asset distribution and its development over time can also be seen in Figure 11. Figure 11 plots the Gini coefficient over time. Its range is from zero to one. A value of 1 means one bank owns everything, while a value of 0 indicates perfect equality.[11] The higher the value, the higher the inequality in asset distribution. The trend of the coefficient supports our observation of rising inequality. An interesting observation here is the impact of crises on the asset distribution. Crisis tend to reduce the inequality and act as a way of redistributing assets. Assuming that assets values fall in times of crisis, the impact of crises must be higher on larger banks. We will look into how different bank size categories are impacted differently by crises in section 5. Reasons for the trends we have just documented are not fully clear. However, geographic deregulation and other regulation reforms such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999 likely supported the increasing inequality. Furthermore, there was a strong belief among investors that larger banks were more likely to be bailed out. This belief made it easier for large banks to finance themselves, aiding the formation of large banks. The result of this is a moral hazard. A bank with a high likelihood to be bailed out takes on too much risk (Emmanuel and Tirole (2012)). The severe consequences of this problem are clear since the financial crisis in 2008. Authorities responded to this issue by setting additional capital requirements on larger banks with frameworks such as Basel 1,2 and 3.




**Figure 11:** Gini coefficient of asset distribution among U.S. commercial banks.

[11] 10% of banks own 10% of assets, 50% of banks own 50% of assets, and so on.

# 5 U.S. commercial banks by size

## 5.1 General

In this section, we allocate banks into different categories ranked by their asset size to analyse possible differences in their balance sheet behaviour. It is a common approach by regulators and academics to categorize banks by their total assets. It measures the gross nominal volume of a bank's activity, but suffers from significant valuation problems, not only for derivatives. In addition, it does not account for differences in individual bank business models. There are alternative ways of categorizing banks, such as using capital or employees as a measure of size, but these will not be considered here.

Following the convention of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, we divide commercial banks by assets into four categories.[12] The first category are the ten largest banks. The second category covers the large banks i.e. the banks ranked from 11 through 100. The third category represent medium banks i.e. banks ranked from 101 through 1000. The last category are the small banks i.e. banks ranked from 1001 and higher. To get an overview of what asset sizes each category covers, Figure 12 contains boxplots for each category and year. Within all categories we can see a consistent rise of overall asset sizes. In 1976 every top 10 bank has an asset size lower than a quarter of a trillion. In 2013 the median asset size of the top 10 banks was 0.32 trillion, with banks going up to an asset size of just under two trillion.[13] We can also see a clear rise in heterogeneity over time regarding the asset sizes of the top 10 banks. The Interquartile Range (IQR) get to its maximum size by the end of the time frame. Large banks began with an asset size far below $0.25 * 10^{11}$ in 1976 and worked their way up to asset sizes of up to $1.75 * 10^{11}$ dollar in 2013. The heterogeneity of large banks regarding asset size also increased over time. Medium banks range between 0.25 and 8 billion dollar assets per bank and small banks between 0.25 and 5 hundred million dollar assets over the given time frame. Figure 12 indicate that the top two categories benefit more from the asset size increases. Compared to the asset increases within the top 10, the typical small bank did not show any significant gains over time.

Overall, the fact that the chosen categories do not have many outliers strengthens our choice of categories. Only the small banks category has a decent amount of outliers with banks that have asset sizes significantly lower than the median small bank.

[12] Our choice of categorization could have been different. The asset size ranges that are covered by the categories, differ over the years. This can be seen as an advantage or disadvantage. On the one side they evolve over the years and possibly match changing asset size levels. On the other side, there is a risk of distributional changes among the asset sizes of banks, making our chosen categorization unsuitable.

[13] Note, we have not combined commercial banks with their matching bank holding company. Bank Holding Companies have asset sizes beyond two trillion.




**Figure 12:** Boxplots for each category. Asset data is logged. Coloured boxes cover the mid 50% of asset sizes - IQR:25th Percentile to 75th Percentile. For the top 10, all individual data-points are marked as dots. For the rest, only outliers are marked as dots. Outliers are data-points above 1.5 times IQR.

## 5.2 Banks' balance sheets by size: Trend and Cycles

In this section we will focus on aggregate balance sheet size trends and cycles for each bank size category. To identify trends, Figure 13 shows us the development of aggregate assets by the defined bank size categories over time.




**Figure 13:** Total assets by bank category.

There are key points in time for each category that mark changes in their asset growth. From the start of the given time frame 1976 until 1985 all the categories show similar growth behaviour. Then, in 1984, the growth of the top 10 assets starts to slow. Shortly after that, 1985 marks a starting point of flat, low growth for the small banks. The small banks do not recover from this low growth period until the end of the considered time frame. An obvious reason for this is the fact that the total number of banks also falls. Table 5 shows that 1984 marks a starting point for a continuous decrease in the number of banks. Large and medium banks asset growth is alike until 1992. From this point in time, medium banks enter a period of low and negative growth, while the large banks go on a period of high growth, together with the top 10 banks. In the 1990s, several regulation reforms occur, likely aiding the growth of larger banks. These reforms are mentioned in section 2 and could be the key drivers for the growth of larger banks in the 1990s. In 2001 the growth rate of large banks also declined. The assets of the top 10 banks, however, kept growing until the financial crisis in 2008.

To analyse short-term movements, in Figure 14 we can see the asset cycles by each category over time. The figure also shows the standard deviation of aggregate assets by category. The numbers indicate that volatility of aggregate assets tends to increase with the size of the bank.




**Figure 14:** Asset cycles by bank size category.

**Financial crisis 2007-08** All bank categories are affected by the crisis in 2008. For each category we see a spike, followed by a fall in assets. Note, the top two categories cover almost 90% of all industry assets, hence this discussion connects to the one already held in section 3 about the whole industry asset cycle. For a more detailed view, table 6 shows the raw cyclical percentage changes. The top 10 banks are affected the most, but this does not come as a surprise as their asset cycle also has a higher volatility. Similarly to the behaviour of all aggregated banks in section 3, all bank sizes have spikes in 2008, which is after the beginning of the crisis defined by NBER. The negative deviation from the trend that follows is also smaller than the upwards movement before. In section 3, we have outlined a variety of reasons why this might be the case. While for the top 10 and large banks the boom of assets thereupon is much stronger than the downturn that follows, medium and small banks asset boom is around the same size to the bust that follows. It seems that larger banks show much more abnormal behaviour in the crisis than the medium and small banks. In other words, the medium and small banks experience a more standard boom and bust cycle. The small banks downturn does not start before

the second half of 2010, suggesting that they perform a more passive role in the crisis i.e. reacting to the crisis rather than causing it.[14]

| date | Top 10 banks | Large banks | Medium banks | Small banks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-12-31 | 2.1 | -1.5 | 1.3 | 0.98 |
| 2007-03-31 | 1.2 | -5.9 | 1.6 | 1.2 |
| 2007-06-30 | 1.7 | -4.1 | 2.6 | 0.4 |
| 2007-09-30 | 2.8 | 1.8 | -1.0 | -0.1 |
| 2007-12-31 | 4.8 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 0.97 |
| 2008-03-31 | 6.2 | 5.2 | 0.39 | 1.6 |
| 2008-06-30 | 2.3 | 5.1 | 0.46 | 1.4 |
| 2008-09-30 | 9.6 | 5.1 | 0.31 | 1.3 |
| 2008-12-31 | 7.8 | 6.6 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| 2009-03-31 | 1.4 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
| 2009-06-30 | -0.77 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| 2009-09-30 | -2.0 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.6 |
| 2009-12-31 | -1.8 | -0.75 | -0.54 | 2.5 |
| 2010-03-31 | 0.34 | -0.97 | -1.2 | 2.2 |
| 2010-06-30 | -2.3 | -0.92 | -3.9 | -0.43 |
| 2010-09-30 | -1.5 | -0.48 | -3.2 | -0.67 |
| 2010-12-31 | -3.2 | -1.4 | -2.9 | -2.5 |
| 2011-03-31 | -3.1 | -1.3 | -3.4 | -2.4 |
| 2011-06-30 | -1.5 | -1.5 | -3.4 | -2.9 |
| 2011-09-30 | 0.65 | -3.9 | -3.4 | -2.6 |
| 2011-12-31 | -0.32 | -2.6 | -3.0 | -1.9 |

**Table 6:** Asset cycles by bank size in crisis 2007/2008. The cycles are in percentage. Top 10 are cat1, large banks are cat2, medium banks are cat3 and small banks are cat4.

**Other crises** While among the large banks we can see an impact of the dotcom bubble, it has almost no effect on the medium and small banks asset cycle. The dotcom bubble was marked by a significant fall in value among stocks. This underlines the more conservative approach by medium and small commercial banks. They do not, for instance, have a notable amount of trading assets. This might be the reason for reduced effect of this crisis.[15] The credit crunch in 1990 also left different footprints on the banks of different sizes. All sizes beside the small banks experience a downturn after the credit crunch. The small banks, however, experience their downturn years before the credit crunch in 1989.

## 5.3 Asset cycle similarity between banks of different sizes

This section goes into detail about the similarity between asset cycles of the different categories. For that reason we compute the Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. Table 7

[14] In section 5.4 we will see that smaller banks tend to have a more conservative balance sheet behaviour.
[15] We address this in the upcoming section 5.4, when discussing the balance sheet composition.

shows the linear correlation between asset cycles over time for each category. As one might expect, all categories positively correlate with the category just below themselves. However, there are significant differences when going beyond that. The top 10 banks have a negative correlation with the medium banks of $-0.27$ and no correlation with the small banks. Although the negative correlation of $-0.27$ is not strong, this difference in asset cycle timings is not one might expect. It suggests that while the top 10 banks might go through a period of decreasing assets, the medium banks might go through a period of increasing assets. However, a closer look at Figure 14 indicates that the main driver for this negative correlation could be the period from 1996 to 1999. Indeed, the exclusion of this time period from the computation reveals a correlation of 0.05. Similar to the relationship between top 10 and small banks, this complete lack of cyclical relationship between large banks and small banks underlines their independence of balance sheet decisions in regards to the other category.

We also compute the autocorrelations to take into account different timings. Significant asset changes of the top 10 might not have an immediate effect on the other categories in the same period, but perhaps one quarter later. We go up to ten quarters back to see possible impacts. The associated tables can be found in the Appendix in Figure 32. An interesting observation can be found for the correlation between top 10 banks and large banks (lag 1) one period later. The correlation rises from 0.4 to 0.43 with one quarter lag. Indicating that large banks react slightly delayed to the decisions of the top 10 banks. Within the other autocorrelations computations there is no sign of anomalies.

| | Top 10 banks | Large banks | Medium banks | Small banks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Top 10 banks | 1.0*** | 0.41*** | -0.27*** | -0.07 |
| Large banks | 0.41*** | 1.0*** | 0.24*** | -0.05 |
| Medium banks | -0.27*** | 0.24*** | 1.0*** | 0.41*** |
| Small banks | -0.07 | -0.05 | 0.41*** | 1.0*** |

**Table 7:** Correlation between cyclical assets of each category. The pearson correlation coefficient is used. The stars after the values indicate significance according to standard levels (***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1).

## 5.4 Balance sheet composition by bank size: Trends

To get an understanding on the balance sheet composition by category and how they differ, Figure 15 and 16 show the share of each account for both sides of the balance sheet. Loans continue to be the highest share on the asset side for all categories. Interestingly, all other categories beside the top 10 banks, show an increasing trend for share of loans. But the top 10 banks share of loans fall over our time frame. Furthermore, only the top 10 banks are engaging in proper trading with a share of trading assets beginning to rise significantly in 1994. For the liabilities, deposits are a main source of funding for all categories. However, the share of deposits varies between the categories. Larger banks

tend to have a lower deposit share than medium and small banks. The share for the top 10 is between 60% and 80% and for the large banks at 60% most of the time. Medium banks have a share that is consistently at 80% and small banks a share of almost 90%. Hence, other forms of finance are relatively low for smaller banks. Our findings confirm the pattern: The larger the bank is, the more alternative ways of financing beside deposits are facilitated.




**Figure 15:** Share of total assets for each balance sheet account.




**Figure 16:** Share of total liabilities for each balance sheet account.

# 6 Leverage

## 6.1 General

In this section we take a look at the leverage of commercial banks. Leverage is a well known and often used concept for monitoring risk and health of financial institutions. While there are a few definitions of leverage, given the dataset we are working with, the focus is on accounting leverage: *total assets / total equity*.[16]. Banks use leverage to improve their return on equity. As long as the interest on external capital does not exceed the total capital ratio, raising external capital, thus increasing leverage, is beneficial for a bank. With this incentive in mind, it might not come as a surprise that when a shareholder asks for a high return, increases in leverage follow. However, this also reduces the buffer to cover losses in case investments turn bad. As a result, increases in leverage can be seen as increases in risk.

We took into account that policy makers set capital requirements on banks on their highest organizational level and aggregated all commercial banks to their belonging bank holding company. We are also removing all banks with negative equity from the dataset as they can be considered bankrupt.[17] We only want to assess leverage behaviour of still operating banks. For more information about bankrupted banks in the dataset see section 3.5.

## 6.2 Is Leverage pro-cyclical?

When looking at balance sheet leverage, it is important to realize its dynamics in relation to asset cycle movements. Let us assume, we have a negative asset cycle and the asset values are falling together with the bank experiencing losses. This reduces banks equity. As balance sheet leverage can be written as *(equity + liabilities) / (equity)*, an reduction in equity results in a rise in leverage, given liabilities do not change. Hence, when banks are not actively adjusting their balance sheet to changes of total assets, leverage moves countercyclical.

However, literature agrees that commercial banks tend to act pro-cyclical in regards to asset changes. Adrian and Shin (2011) as well as Greenlaw et al. (2008) support this notion using the same data source. We check these result for robustness by altering various factors involved in the computation. While Adrian and Shin (2011) use the growth rates of both asset and leverage and compute leverage by aggregating assets and equity of all commercial banks first, essentially computing leverage of the commercial banking market as a whole, we use the cycles of both assets and leverage instead of the growth rate and compute the leverage of each individual bank first and then take the average of

[16] Tier 1 capital, as defined in Basel III.

[17] Banks with negative equity do not report financial information in the following periods. Only in the rare case of bailouts they survive.

all individual leverage ratios. We also take a look at a larger time frame than Adrian and Shin (2011). Ours is from $1976 - 2013$ and Adrian and Shin (2011) is from $1983 - 2010$. Greenlaw et al. (2008) take an aggregate approach as well, but focus only on the five largest commercial banks. In particular, the use of averages instead of aggregates does mark a significant difference between the mentioned literature and our work. Within the aggregate approach, leverage has a weighted impact on computations depending on a bank's size. Whereas in our average method, banks' leverage is all weighted the same, independent from a bank size. Considering the structural properties of the the commercial banks industry in U.S., we would expect the aggregate method to have its focus more on large banks, while the average method results apply more for small banks. Figure 17 shows the result of the average approach for all commercial banks together. Although we can derive that commercial banks actively manage their leverage, no pro-cyclicality can be identified. Applying the same leverage computation as Adrian and Shin (2011) gives use Figure 18, showing a positive relationship. The distinct results between the two Figures indicate that within Figure 18 the large banks drive the pro-cyclicality. While within Figure 17, where every banks leverage is weighted the same, the much higher quantity of small banks reduces the pro-cyclical impact of large banks on the average. To reveal more information about leverage pro-cyclicality among commercial banks, we apply the average and aggregate approach to different banks sizes. With the background of our existing analysis one would expect to make two observations:

1. Large banks do have pro-cyclic leverage behaviour, but small banks do not.

2. The more homogeneous the banks in one bank size category are, the more similar the results of the two computational methods would be. We know that our upper two categories (top 10 and large banks) always include a smaller amount of banks. In addition, when considering the standard deviation, as seen in Figure 26 in section 6.4, the upper categories are much more similar in regards to their leverage than the lower two categories (small and medium). As a result, we might see more similarity between the two computational methods for larger banks.

Figure 20 and 19 give us scatterplots by bank size. Indeed, we can confirm hypothesis 2. The top 10 banks and large banks show similar relationships within both Figures, but the relationships identified for medium and small banks differ significantly between the two Figures. While Figure 19 finds a correlation coefficient near zero for medium banks and a correlation for small banks of 0.15, Figure 20 finds stronger positive correlations for small and medium banks: 0.35 and 0.34. Hence, we can deduce that the cyclicality in regards to leverage for large banks is robust to both treatments of the data, but not for medium and small banks. However, hypothesis 1 cannot be clearly confirmed. The top 10, with a coefficient of 0.24, show less pro-cyclicality than large banks, with a coefficient of 0.44. In addition, because of the different results received for the smaller banks, it

is difficult to arrive at a conclusion about their pro-cyclicality. The larger banks within the medium and smaller bank size category might drive the pro-cyclicality seen in Figure 20. One would need to split the smaller banks into additional categories to get a better understanding of their behaviour.

A conclusion that can be drawn for banks of all sizes is that they actively manage leverage, otherwise we would need to observe a negative relationship as we explain above. Finally, it is important to note the consequences of the observed pro-cyclicality among certain bank sizes.[18]. It means that they do not only actively adjust their balance sheets, but they are increasing leverage in good times and decreasing leverage in bad times. They are taking on additional debt to not only balance the usual negative relationship, but to lever their assets even further. This has severe impacts on a countries business cycle. In good times, banks might lever to much and take on to much risk. In bad times, banks act to conservative hindering recovery.




**Figure 17:** Cyclical Assets versus Cyclical Leverage (All commercial banks). We compute the leverage for each bank individually and then take the average. With that average, we then compute cyclical changes. For the assets we also take the average and then compute the cyclical changes.

[18]Medium-sized banks and on a smaller level of the top 10 banks show clear pro-cyclicality.




**Figure 18:** Cylical Assets versus Cyclical Leverage (All commercial banks). We compute the leverage of all banks by (aggregate assets / aggregate equity). We then compute cyclical changes of leverage and assets.




**Figure 19:** Cylical Assets versus Cyclical Leverage by Category.We compute the leverage for each bank individually and then take the average. With that average, we then compute cyclical changes. For the assets we also take the average and the compute the cyclical changes. (corr: pearson correlation, sig: 2-tailed p-value rounded to third place after comma, Cat1: top 10 banks, cat2: large banks, cat3: medium banks, cat4: small banks.




**Figure 20:** Cylical Assets versus Cyclical Leverage by Category. We compute the leverage of bank by category with (aggregate assets / aggregate equity). We then compute cyclical changes of leverage and assets.

## 6.3 Did pro-cyclicality change over time?

While the approach of the previous paragraph analyses pro-cyclicality of commercial banks over the whole time frame, this paragraph splits the time frame into 10-year time ranges to observe if their cyclic leverage behaviour might vary over time. Table 8 and 9 below show the correlations of cyclical assets with cyclical leverage depending on the two types of computation used for all commercial banks.[19] In Table 8 we can observe positive correlations for the two more recent 10-year time periods. The first time period from 1980 to 1990 has a positive correlation of 0.24 but its p-value above 0.05 is to high to be significant.[20] These partly positive correlations align with the positive correlation identified for the whole time frame in Figure 17. On the other hand, Table 9 shows us completely different results. Here we find a significant positive correlation for the first time period, but an insignificant positive correlation for the period from 1990 to 2000 and a negative correlation for the most recent time period. These opposing correlations are

[19] See the captions within the tables for more detail.

[20] The lower sample size of only ten years of data, might have an impact on the p-value.

probably the reason for a correlation of almost zero in Figure 17. It seems like in 2000 to 2010 the average commercial bank did not actively manage its leverage, resulting in leverage behaving counter-cyclical.

| | year range | correlation | significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1980-1990 | 0.24 | 0.13 |
| 1 | 1990-2000 | 0.53 | 0.00 |
| 2 | 2000-2010 | 0.51 | 0.00 |

**Table 8:** Correlation of cyclical aggregate leverage with cyclical aggregate assets over time. We compute the leverage of all banks by (aggregate assets / aggregate equity). We then compute cyclical changes of leverage as well as assets. There are N=40 observations per time-range. Significance is rounded to two decimal places.

| | year range | correlation | significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1980-1990 | 0.41 | 0.01 |
| 1 | 1990-2000 | 0.17 | 0.31 |
| 2 | 2000-2010 | -0.62 | 0.00 |

**Table 9:** Correlation of cyclical average leverage with cyclical average assets over time. We compute the leverage for each bank individually and then take the average. With that average, we then compute cyclical changes. For the assets we also take the average and the compute the cyclical changes. Significance is rounded to two decimal places.

To find out which bank sizes drive the above observed behaviour we apply the same methods to each bank size category. The results can be seen in Table 10 and 11.[21] We divide the discussion of the results by the time periods in question.

**1980-1990** Both methods give insignificant correlation results for the top 10 and large banks.[22]. The only significant values with $p < 0.01$ are in Table 10 for medium and small banks. Hence, the only conclusion that can be drawn, is that aggregate leverage of small and medium banks tends to move pro-cyclical for the time period in question. This is identical to the results from Figure 20 over the time frame $1976 - 2013$ in section 6.2 before.

**1990-2000** For this time period, we find that large and small banks behave pro-cyclical. This behaviour is robust towards both computational methods applied. In addition, we find pro-cyclic behaviour for medium banks in Table 10. This pro-cyclic behaviour of the medium and large banks might have driven the positive correlation for all banks found in Table 8 for $1990 - 2000$. All other results for this time frame are insignificant.

[21] Note, the high number of insignificant values observed makes it difficult to derive conclusions here.
[22] Again, this might be caused by the lower sample size

**2000-2010** The most recent time period shows small pro-cyclical behaviour with correlations of 0.37 and 0.3 from the top 10 banks. The similarity of both findings confirm their robustness to both data treatments. Although other observations for different bank sizes are insignificant. The negative correlation observed in Table 9 combined with the insignificant negative observation seen within the medium banks in Table 11 suggests that the medium banks might be driving the negative correlation in Table 8.

Overall, we see that pro-cylicality among commercial banks is not always consistent over time. The average bank for instance did behave pro-cyclic from $1980 - 1990$, but counter-cyclic in recent times from $2000 - 2010$. However, the fact that leverage of the commercial banking sector as whole is pro-cylical, is to some extent consistent over time as seen in Table 8.

| | year range | Correlation | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top 10 banks | 1980-1990 | 0.21 | 0.2 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.08 | 0.62 |
| | 2000-2010 | 0.37 | 0.018 |
| Large banks | 1980-1990 | 0.21 | 0.18 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.67 | 0.0 |
| | 2000-2010 | 0.22 | 0.18 |
| Medium banks | 1980-1990 | 0.57 | 0.0 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.48 | 0.002 |
| | 2000-2010 | 0.036 | 0.83 |
| Small banks | 1980-1990 | 0.56 | 0.0 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.55 | 0.0 |
| | 2000-2010 | -0.2 | 0.21 |

**Table 10:** Correlation of cyclical aggregate leverage with cyclical aggregate assets over time. We compute the leverage of all banks by (aggregate assets / aggregate equity). We then compute cyclical changes of leverage as well as assets. Significance is rounded to three decimal places.

| | year range | Correlation | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top 10 banks | 1980-1990 | 0.15 | 0.34 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.075 | 0.65 |
| | 2000-2010 | 0.3 | 0.063 |
| Large banks | 1980-1990 | 0.25 | 0.12 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.58 | 0.0 |
| | 2000-2010 | 0.072 | 0.66 |
| Medium banks | 1980-1990 | 0.23 | 0.16 |
| | 1990-2000 | -0.041 | 0.8 |
| | 2000-2010 | -0.26 | 0.1 |
| Small banks | 1980-1990 | 0.086 | 0.6 |
| | 1990-2000 | 0.36 | 0.022 |
| | 2000-2010 | -0.086 | 0.6 |

**Table 11:** Correlation of cyclical average leverage with cyclical average assets over time. We compute the leverage for each bank individually and then take the average. With that average, we then compute cyclical changes. For the assets we also take the average and the compute the cyclical changes.

## 6.4 Leverage development

**Long-term discussion** This section deals with long-term trends of leverage among commercial banks. The first panel of Figure 21 shows the mean, median and weighted-average leverage for each point in time. We can see a clear impact of high levered banks on the average. Especially, in the periods around 1990 and 2008 when bankruptcy levels are high, there are major mean leverage increases as seen in Figure 21. The median gives us a clearer indication how leverage among healthy banks look. Hence, depending of what type of measure we choose (average or median), we arrive at different observations. The only consistent information conveyed by all measures is a falling trend in leverage from year 1976 to 2013. The median, representing the typical bank, starts with a leverage of 12.5 in 1976 and falls continuously over the years to 10 in 2013. The mean also falls from 12.5 to 10. It has some short-term fluctuations in 1990 and 2008, which we will elaborate on later. The weighted-average leverage, taking into account the total assets of a bank, starts with a significant higher level of leverage at 18, but then also falls to a leverage ratio of 10 in 2013. The idea behind the weighted leverage is that larger banks with more assets have a stronger impact on the overall systemic risk than smaller banks. The significant measurement differences between the common average and weighted leverage, marks the importance of differentiating between asset sizes in leverage analysis. Also, as seen in Figure 10, the small banks dominate the bank landscape in quantity. As a result, the overall average leverage and small banks average leverage are almost identical. The first graph in Figure 22 shows the average leverage for each defined bank size category. Here we can also see an overall decreasing trend in leverage along all categories. This can be attributed to regulatory efforts such as Basel $1, 2$ and 3. In addition, the graph shows an

interesting pattern until 1993 - the larger the bank the more it levers. However, after 1993, the pattern seems to disappear. In 2013, the pattern even reverses - the larger the bank the lower the leverage. These observations are closely linked to information gathered in section 4. If the top 10 banks would have kept their higher leverage, their significant rise in total asset share from 1993 and onwards would have resulted in major leverage increases for the whole banking sector. Hence, regulators adjusted their regulations to target systemically important banks with stronger capital requirements (G-SIB Framework). The top 10 banks are affected by these additional capital requirements.




**Figure 21:** Median and Average leverage for all banks. The weighted-average leverage ratio is calculated by taking into account the asset size for each bank every point in time. Every leverage ratio for each individual bank is only accounted in the weighted-average by its share of assets compared to the total assets of all banks at that point of time.




**Figure 22:** Average leverage by category.

**Short-term discussion** For short term analysis, we consider the cyclical component and standard deviation of leverage. The standard deviation as seen in panel 2 of Figure 21 indicates previously identified two critical points in time - 1990 and 2008. Looking at the first panel in Figure 23, the cyclical graph also highlights those same periods. However, similar to the standard deviation, the spike in average leverage for all banks occurs right after the NBER crisis definition. We know that small banks drive the average leverage with their quantity. Hence, their cyclical components - panel 1 and panel 5 - in Figure 23 are almost identical. In comparison to the small banks, the cyclical leverage of the top 10 banks actually spikes during the crisis in 2007-8. The large and medium banks show behaviour right between the two outer categories, top 10 and small. The large banks have small peaks during and after the crisis. The medium banks only have a peak up to 2 after the crisis, closer resembling the small banks. Note, the panel for the medium banks cyclical leverage contains some extreme outliers in year 1992 Quarter 4, which increased the limits of the vertical axis up to 20. To ease analysis, table 24 gives us the actual cyclical values of the average leverage for the crisis periods. We marked changes more than four percent in red. Similar to the graph, we can see a spill-over effect of high leverage from large to small banks. Figure 25 gives us a visual insight into the structural changes that occur regarding asset size and leverage. Each data-point represents one bank. We can see a clear increase in dispersion of leverage in 2009 among the small and medium banks. This aligns with the standard deviation shown in Figure 26, where it also has a spike in 2009. It is important to mention that the previously defined pro-cyclicality of leverage stands in contrast to the observations made in the 2007-08 crisis. We have defined pro-cyclicality with positive co-movement of leverage with assets and not GDP. While it could well be the case that the GDP is falling in the 2007-08 crisis, total assets of commercial banks do not immediately behave the same, see section 3.




**Figure 23:** Cyclical average leverage by category. The medium banks contains a banks with leverage over 10000 in year 1992Q4, which results in this exorbitant high spike.

| year | quarter | cyclical_leverage_cat1 | cyclical_leverage_cat2 | cyclical_leverage_cat3 | cyclical_leverage_cat4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007.0 | 1.0 | -0.029887 | -0.021031 | -0.056249 | -0.032116 |
| | 2.0 | -0.012429 | -0.009437 | -0.051671 | -0.031969 |
| | 3.0 | 0.039798 | -0.042668 | -0.071142 | -0.057048 |
| | 4.0 | 0.039783 | -0.024953 | -0.067480 | -0.053403 |
| 2008.0 | 1.0 | 0.060017 | -0.022654 | -0.075584 | -0.058472 |
| | 2.0 | 0.038200 | -0.012307 | -0.048921 | -0.032843 |
| | 3.0 | 0.226450 | -0.001022 | -0.011661 | -0.037448 |
| | 4.0 | 0.170388 | 0.041481 | 0.009405 | -0.017864 |
| 2009.0 | 1.0 | 0.014133 | 0.063467 | 0.024552 | -0.018963 |
| | 2.0 | -0.025306 | 0.045066 | 0.034259 | -0.003208 |
| | 3.0 | -0.046115 | 0.044002 | 0.195956 | -0.008145 |
| | 4.0 | -0.055506 | 0.059162 | 0.358070 | 0.238390 |
| 2010.0 | 1.0 | -0.032219 | 0.038947 | 0.043614 | 0.028410 |
| | 2.0 | -0.077345 | -0.005151 | 0.023953 | 0.011182 |
| | 3.0 | -0.065939 | -0.043899 | 0.019594 | 0.045642 |
| | 4.0 | -0.060088 | -0.016217 | 0.075700 | 0.059942 |

**Figure 24:** Cyclical Average Leverage.




**Figure 25:** Assets versus Leverage. Banks with leverage ratios beyond 50 are considered as outlier and not included. Each data-point represents one bank.




**Figure 26:** Standard deviation of leverage by category. The medium banks contains a banks with leverage over 10000 in year 1992Q4, which results in this exorbitant high spike.

## 6.5 Leverage distribution

**Long-term discussion** In regards to the distribution of leverage, we have plotted the skewness as well as the kurtosis for all banks in Figure 21. Both variables behave similar. There are periods of strong as well as low variation. Notable periods of high variation are the periods around the two banking crises in 1990 and 2008. Since high positive skewness means a right-skewed graph with the mean being higher than the median and high kurtosis indicates a graph with heavy tails, together they prove the existence of high positive outliers. The periods with low variation in turn indicate periods of normal distributed leverage. Furthermore, the two variables only move in the positive direction (values of zero and above). For the skewness, this can be explained by the fact that banks are kind of "sticky" to the lower boundaries of leverage, with not much variation happening within banks of the left tail of the distribution. But there is much more variation happening between banks located at the right tail of the distribution - banks with

leverage above the mode. Essentially, high levered banks show much higher variation in their leverage ratio than low levered, conservative banks. The consistent positive kurtosis in turn tells us that there are never less outlier than a normal distribution.
Figure 28 and 27 give us the distribution information by asset size over time. It is important to note that the overall distribution is mainly driven by small banks, because of their sheer quantity. Thus, the division by categories gives us a clearer view. Again, skewness and kurtosis behave very similarly. For the top 10 and large banks we have short periods where the skewness moves below zero. We take a look at those periods in the short-term discussion. The rest of the time, both measures are either zero or above for all categories, suggesting that once you have a certain amount of banks, the distribution tends to be right skewed. In general, we can deduce that most of the distributional changes in our graphs are driven by two factors:

1. Already high levered banks increasing their leverage even more (high skewness)

2. Increases of outliers (high kurtosis)

These factors seem to be most present around the crisis in 1990 and the crisis in 2008. Hence, the significant graph movements around that time periods. The top 10 banks have a negative kurtosis in some periods, which means the top 10 banks have less outlier than the normal distribution. Hence, the top 10 banks tend to act together regarding their leverage decisions. They also show much less distributional volatility around the credit crunch crisis in 1990, compared to the other categories. Actually, when moving along our categories, the distributional changes are higher the smaller the banks become. This aligns with the arguments made about the standard deviation in the paragraph before.




**Figure 27:** Kurtosis of leverage by category.




**Figure 28:** Skewness of leverage by category.

**Short-term discussion** As mentioned, in our short-term analysis, we investigate the reason skewness turns negative in some periods. The negative measurements of the top 10 in the crisis 2008 are particularly interesting, since we associate crises with already high levered banks increasing leverage even more. However, this could indicate some low levered banks within the top 10 became high leveraged as well. The skewness rises from 2008 Quarter 1 to 2008 Quarter 3 and then it takes a dive in 2008 Quarter 4 and 2009 Quarter 1. As a result, the distribution of leverage is left skewed in 2008 Quarter 4 and 2009 Quarter 1. This left skewness means that the mean is to the left of the peak. To have a better overview, Figure 29 combines a boxplot with the top 10 banks leverage ratios marked as dots for the year and quarter in question. The boxplot as whole and the lower whisker moved significantly up from 2007 to 2008. Both are characteristics of left skewness. Here, we can see an overall increase in leverage among top 10 banks, not only driven by outliers. Despite being small in numbers, the asset share of the top 10 was 60% in year 2013. Therefore, this had a significant impact on the bank industry, documented as a spill-over effect in the sections before.

The skewness of the top 10 also became negative in the years around 1980. Similar to conclusions we have drawn about the crisis in 2008, this indicates a general increase in leverage among the top 10 banks.




**Figure 29:** Boxplot: Leverage data points. The first row of plots represents the top 10 and the second row the large banks.

# 7 Conclusion

In general, this thesis gives a broad overview over the U.S. commercial bank landscape and key important factors that should be considered. We find interesting trends and cycles on an aggregate level as well as for different bank sizes. We also outline major structural changes for the whole commercial bank industry over the considered time frame. Considering the insights gathered from the "Too Big to Fail" section, inequality in the distribution of assets has risen to extremely high levels over the time frame.

For some short-term periods we go into greater depths than for others. The main periods of focus were the years around 1990 and 2007. Due to the variety of factors involved, explaining the balance sheet impacts of the 2007-08 crisis on U.S. commercial banks does have more complexity than one might expect. For the period around 1990, it was also difficult to trace down the exact causal explanations for the observations in the data as this period was marked by more than one special event.

One trend that might be of high interest for regulators is the consistent downward trend of leverage connected to a consistent increase in the share of equity, especially among large banks. This can be attributed to the interventions broad forward with Basel 1,2 and 3.

The thesis also confirmed the importance to distinguish between banks of different sizes. Important differences were found in the balance sheet share of different liabilities and in leverage behaviour. Large banks facilitate more ways of alternative financing than small. They also tend to have stronger pro-cyclical leverage than small banks. Pro-cyclicality of leverage in general, differs significantly between banks of different sizes.

Many points discussed are open for interpretation and future work should go into more detail about the approached topics. For instance, it would be interesting to find an optimal way to categorize U.S. commercial banks. The literature seems to have found no coherent way of categorization. These categories would obviously be of key importance to regulators. Furthermore, the large amount of literature about leverage indicates that there is a wide variety of possibilities to explore this topic in greater depths. One might consider the relationship of leverage not just with total assets, but GDP and other variables. Moreover, commercial banks are just a part of the financial intermediaries existing economies have. The so called shadow banking sector does play a major role in today's financial industry and hold a significant share of total assets. It was also the major part of the shadow banking sector, the investment banks, which had to bear the impacts of the 2007-08 financial crisis. Lastly, another factor that we have not taken into account is that a big fraction of assets, especially for large commercial banks, are off balance sheet items, according to Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011).

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# A Appendix

| | lag | assets | cash | fedfundsrepoasset | securities | loansnet | tradingassets | otherassets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0.668482 | 0.543616 | 0.678344 | 0.857966 | 0.874169 | 0.670577 | 0.686616 |
| 2 | 2 | 0.549088 | 0.385644 | 0.441868 | 0.663799 | 0.750934 | 0.462435 | 0.564927 |
| 3 | 3 | 0.383607 | 0.185667 | 0.262141 | 0.481113 | 0.582572 | 0.290667 | 0.429074 |
| 4 | 4 | 0.364207 | 0.276731 | 0.141942 | 0.259817 | 0.426244 | 0.183740 | 0.414830 |
| 5 | 5 | 0.094690 | 0.003499 | -0.063425 | 0.026585 | 0.225113 | -0.058170 | 0.243093 |
| 6 | 6 | 0.023946 | 0.023056 | -0.208787 | -0.153482 | 0.071170 | -0.161202 | 0.167211 |
| 7 | 7 | -0.114478 | -0.179763 | -0.294161 | -0.288772 | -0.092589 | -0.247924 | 0.069033 |
| 8 | 8 | -0.103289 | -0.096091 | -0.311070 | -0.350237 | -0.192288 | -0.221654 | -0.017683 |

**Figure 30:** Autocorrelation - Asset side.

| lag | equity | fedfundsrepoliab | deposits | foreigndep | otherborrowedmoney | tradingliabilities | subordinateddebt | otherliab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 0.723293 | 0.628063 | 0.328080 | 0.798504 | 0.731746 | 0.529164 | 0.805696 | 0.368007 |
| 2 | 0.449616 | 0.404419 | 0.292106 | 0.661453 | 0.541543 | 0.243973 | 0.689890 | 0.012917 |
| 3 | 0.179874 | 0.211710 | 0.055729 | 0.463610 | 0.361965 | 0.147006 | 0.509253 | 0.078217 |
| 4 | 0.009426 | 0.183654 | 0.348144 | 0.329830 | 0.283648 | -0.132563 | 0.336406 | 0.145914 |
| 5 | -0.103217 | 0.005744 | -0.196956 | 0.117763 | 0.173004 | -0.291591 | 0.190992 | -0.091779 |
| 6 | -0.109206 | -0.058821 | -0.179869 | 0.001884 | 0.064673 | -0.387505 | 0.081116 | -0.295527 |
| 7 | -0.155159 | -0.182500 | -0.321517 | -0.124807 | -0.095045 | -0.427252 | -0.068200 | -0.089373 |
| 8 | -0.143907 | -0.143367 | 0.106174 | -0.155675 | -0.215672 | -0.382195 | -0.173296 | 0.008344 |

**Figure 31:** Autocorrelation - Liabilities side.

| lag | cat1_assets+cat1_assets | cat1_assets+cat2_assets | cat1_assets+cat3_assets | cat1_assets+cat4_assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1.0 | 0.41 | -0.27 | -0.069 |
| 1 | 0.66 | 0.34 | -0.26 | -0.088 |
| 2 | 0.44 | 0.27 | -0.18 | -0.032 |
| 3 | 0.36 | 0.18 | -0.11 | -0.007 |
| 4 | 0.26 | 0.079 | -0.084 | -0.029 |
| 5 | 0.055 | -0.057 | 0.044 | 0.0053 |
| 6 | -0.029 | -0.14 | 0.2 | 0.12 |
| 7 | -0.11 | -0.19 | 0.32 | 0.18 |
| 8 | -0.18 | -0.17 | 0.36 | 0.14 |
| 9 | -0.21 | -0.11 | 0.36 | 0.12 |

| lag | cat2_assets+cat1_assets | cat2_assets+cat2_assets | cat2_assets+cat3_assets | cat2_assets+cat4_assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.41 | 1.0 | 0.24 | -0.046 |
| 1 | 0.43 | 0.63 | 0.11 | -0.19 |
| 2 | 0.4 | 0.53 | 0.12 | -0.14 |
| 3 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.075 | -0.16 |
| 4 | 0.31 | 0.3 | 0.21 | -0.016 |
| 5 | 0.25 | 0.071 | 0.084 | -0.15 |
| 6 | 0.18 | -0.00094 | 0.12 | -0.089 |
| 7 | 0.074 | -0.13 | 0.11 | -0.063 |
| 8 | 0.019 | -0.12 | 0.2 | 0.068 |
| 9 | 0.019 | -0.3 | 0.04 | -0.033 |

| lag | cat3_assets+cat1_assets | cat3_assets+cat2_assets | cat3_assets+cat3_assets | cat3_assets+cat4_assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | -0.27 | 0.24 | 1.0 | 0.41 |
| 1 | -0.14 | 0.12 | 0.68 | 0.14 |
| 2 | -0.04 | 0.14 | 0.53 | 0.025 |
| 3 | -0.026 | 0.047 | 0.35 | -0.09 |
| 4 | 0.048 | 0.1 | 0.34 | -0.0024 |
| 5 | 0.095 | -0.076 | -0.0006 | -0.17 |
| 6 | 0.13 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.19 |
| 7 | 0.061 | -0.19 | -0.31 | -0.23 |
| 8 | 0.048 | -0.22 | -0.29 | -0.083 |
| 9 | -0.089 | -0.43 | -0.45 | -0.11 |

| lag | cat4_assets+cat1_assets | cat4_assets+cat2_assets | cat4_assets+cat3_assets | cat4_assets+cat4_assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | -0.069 | -0.046 | 0.41 | 1.0 |
| 1 | 0.0062 | -0.12 | 0.22 | 0.71 |
| 2 | 0.036 | -0.054 | 0.2 | 0.55 |
| 3 | -0.033 | -0.083 | 0.16 | 0.39 |
| 4 | -0.0073 | 0.019 | 0.25 | 0.42 |
| 5 | 0.035 | -0.1 | 0.051 | 0.15 |
| 6 | 0.055 | -0.067 | 0.0012 | 0.016 |
| 7 | -0.043 | -0.12 | -0.057 | -0.13 |
| 8 | -0.11 | -0.08 | 0.054 | -0.063 |
| 9 | -0.2 | -0.22 | -0.058 | -0.22 |

**Figure 32:** Correlations: Category 1-4. This graph shows the correlation of a banks size category assets with the lagged assets of another banks size category. The category after the "+" is the lagged category. Hence, the first graph shows the correlation between categories 1 aggregate assets and all the different other categories lagged aggregate assets.

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (-0.001, 100000.0] | 12717.0 | 11674.0 | 9145.0 | 6613.0 | 4810.0 | 3435.0 | 2313.0 |
| (100000.0, 1000000.0] | 1507.0 | 2287.0 | 2693.0 | 2843.0 | 3055.0 | 3562.0 | 3670.0 |
| (1000000.0, 10000000.0] | 174.0 | 287.0 | 325.0 | 342.0 | 307.0 | 381.0 | 413.0 |
| (10000000.0, 10000000000.0] | 18.0 | 27.0 | 49.0 | 75.0 | 80.0 | 80.0 | 83.0 |

**Figure 33:** Banks count by asset size. The left column is the asset interval size and the corresponding row the number of banks per year.




**Figure 34:** Cyclical median leverage by category.




**Figure 35:** Cyclical standard deviation of leverage by category. The medium banks contains a banks with leverage over 10000 in year 1992Q4, which results in this exorbitant high spike.

Hiermit versichere ich, die vorliegende Abschlussarbeit selbstständig und nur unter Verwendung der von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verfasst zu haben. Sowohl inhaltlich als auch wörtlich entnommene Inhalte wurden als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit hat in dieser oder vergleichbarer Form noch keinem anderen Prüfungsgremium vorgelegen.

Karlsruhe, den 01.08.2020

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